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I. INTRODUCTION
Matthew Adler’s fine paper on welfarism and regulation tackles
ambitiously and elegantly the normative foundations of modern regulation. 1 This most recent paper is part of a nice triptych begun with
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis2 and Incommensurability and CostBenefit Analysis.3 In these articles, Professor Adler lays out a deeply
reflective case for a welfarist theory of regulation.4 Moreover, he
makes the case, albeit more ambivalently, for cost-benefit analysis as
a key part of the template for regulatory choice. 5 In the conclusion to
Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, Professors Adler and Posner maintain that “[a]gencies should use [cost-benefit analysis] to evaluate the
welfare effect of large projects,”6 qualifying, however, their recommendation of its use because of potentially negative distributional
consequences. Cost-benefit analysis, therefore, should not be used
“where wealth differences between those who gain from the project
and those who lose are substantial enough.”7

* Dean and Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
1. See Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV . 241 (2000) [hereinafter Beyond Efficiency]. Professor
Adler states:
My focus will be legal scholarship, since it is legal scholars who, in recent years,
have paid the most sustained attention to the problem of justifying regulation—the problem of generating a moral theory of regulation in light of which
general regulatory approaches, specific regulatory decisions, the design of regulatory agencies, and all other aspects of regulation can be evaluated as good or
bad, right or wrong.
Id. at 241-42.
2. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 165 (1999).
3. Matthew D. Adler, Incommensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L.
REV . 1371 (1998) [hereinafter Incommensurability].
4. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1; Incommensurability, supra note 3; Adler &
Posner, supra note 2.
5. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1; Incommensurability, supra note 3; Adler &
Posner, supra note 2.
6. Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 238.
7. Id.
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The contribution of the rather dense analytical paper for this Florida State University symposium is both to dismantle two of the standard normative accounts for regulation and administrative law, accounts which Professor Adler classifies as neoclassical and proceduralist, and to point the way toward an avowedly welfarist account. 8
The careful, and mostly philosophical, analysis of this paper, like
previous work by Professor Adler in this same vein, is a tour de force.
Not only is it head and shoulders above much of the rather intuitionist, and often analytically slim, sort of theoretical work in the legal
literature on regulation and administrative law, but it also has going
for it that it is within a growing body of legal analysis which looks to
economic analysis and more scientific methods to provide a richer
substantive grounding to prescriptive regulation and regulatory theory.9 Professor Adler’s work shows exactly what sort of value is added
by bringing an able philosophical mind and technique to serious public law problems.
The purpose of this Comment is to suggest ways in which more
scrupulous attention to the nature and characteristics of modern
regulatory decisionmaking and the role of institutions in structuring
such decisionmaking might contribute to the omnibus welfarist approach to regulation. My claim is that the essentially incremental
character of modern regulatory administration raises doubts about
the utility of a welfarist set of criteria, whether cost-benefit analysis
or some other technique.
II. ADLER’S WELFARISM
Professor Adler lays out, in lengthy detail, the case for welfarism
as a superior normative talisman for regulatory choice. 10 Sometimes
this case is styled as arrestingly new and, therefore, as a significantly different approach to realizing overall well-being through the
regulatory system. 11 At other times, he admits that his approach is
8. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 243-44.
9. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J.
1981, 1984 (1998) (questioning the “pervasive reliance on [John] Morrall’s table in scholarly and political discussion of risk regulation”); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI . L. REV . 1, 11 (1995) (evaluating President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,866, suggesting “reforms that will simultaneously promote economic and democratic goals”); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM . L. REV . 941, 948 (1999) (stating
that his “[a]rticle underscores the extent to which discounting raises analytically distinct
issues in the cases of latent harms and harms to future generations, even though these two
scenarios have generally been treated as manifestations of the same problem”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI . L. REV . 1533, 1536 (1996) (stating that it is
his “goal” to “explore the relation between health-health tradeoffs and the law, in an effort
to see how governmental judgments . . . might be improved”).
10. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 288-336.
11. See id. at 241, 245, 335.
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merely a form of “refurbished neoclassicism,” that is, a better way of
both enhancing the (more perfected) preferences of individuals and
increasing utility.12 In both its modest and immodest versions, this
enterprise of solidifying the theoretical case for welfarism as the talisman for regulatory choices strikes me as not only plausible but correct. In any event, it is an entirely defensible (and indeed Adler defends it well) normative framework for assessing the performance of
regulatory institutions in a modern state. Moreover, the smaller part
of the thesis, that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is mostly unnecessary and,
on occasion, works at cross-purposes with a welfarist account, is
completely persuasive on Adler’s account. 13 Also persuasive is Adler’s
argument that Pareto-superiority provides one good basis for assessing regulatory options but is, in the end, an entirely too risky account. 14
The power of welfarist theory vis-à-vis proceduralist frameworks
for regulatory choice seems likewise strong. If anything is to be
faulted, it is that Professor Adler gives much too much attention to
the “Big-P” Proceduralism in mainstream administrative law and
regulation scholarship. 15 The proceduralism of the sort described in
the paper has few remaining adherents. The heyday of such strong
proceduralism was the 1970s, when the work of key administrative
law scholars fashioned the case for augmented procedures in regulatory decisionmaking,16 “hard look” review by federal courts, 17 and a
dialogic conception of relationships among agencies, businesses, and
interest groups. 18 By the time Richard Stewart wrote his seminal
piece on the reformation of administrative law, 19 such proceduralist
conceptions were already on the retreat. 20 Significantly, even the
hard look doctrine of the 1980s and 1990s was attached much more
tightly to normative theories of enhanced regulatory performance

12. Id. at 244, 289, 319-32.
13. See id. at 248-62.
14. See id. at 255-57.
15. See id. at 267-88.
16. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Revising the Administrative Procedure Act, 29
ADMIN. L. REV . 35 (1977).
17. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Portland Cement Ass’n
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444
F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
18. See, e.g., MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO G UARDS THE G UARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATION 47-49 (1988).
19. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV . L. REV . 1667 (1975) (“The court should . . . not . . . impose upon the agency its own
notion of which procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to further some vague undefined public
good.”).
20. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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than to the intrinsic values of due process and procedural justice. 21 It
is appropriate to note in a symposium organized by Professor Mark
Seidenfeld that Professor Seidenfeld is among a fairly small group of
administrative law scholars who are committed to a strong proceduralist vision of administrative agency decisionmaking.22 There are
few Big-P Proceduralists left.
There remain, as Professor Adler acknowledges, strands of normative theory which may stand in the way of welfarism/refurbished
neoclassicism. 23 Deontological, perfectionist, and distributive themes
are significant aspects of contemporary regulatory theory.24 Adler describes these criteria as potential “partitions,” separating the space
between avowedly welfarist theories of regulation and other, nonwelfarist considerations. 25 While the gist of Adler’s prescriptive theorizing suggests that these partitions need not stand in the way of welfarist approaches, it is not clear that these exceptions have not swallowed the rule. After all, the attachment among theorists to deontological, rights-based themes in regulatory discourse is found in many
different parts of the literature, including in scholarship calling for
augmented welfare rights 26 and that championing the environmental
justice movement. 27 Significantly, this discourse runs against the
grain of welfarist theories by injecting deep considerations of equity
and substantive justice into the mix. To be sure, I suspect that in the
end Professor Adler and I would agree that these deontological considerations cannot adequately support modern regulatory theory.
Yet, the persistence of rights-based theories at least raises the stakes
associated with partitioning nonwelfarist considerations. We are left
with the theoretical and empirical questions of how efficacious deontological theories of regulation are.
As Professor Adler deploys his ammunition against theoretical
targets, the relative attention he gives to largely anachronistic proceduralist theories versus the attention he gives to those raised in his
discussion of partitions and partitioning is curious. 28 A caveat which

21. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW : RETHINKING
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 213-64 (1990) (describing role of hard look review as
facilitating “sound governance”).
22. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV . L. REV . 1511 (1992).
23. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 288-89.
24. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 34-35 (1990).
25. Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 313-19.
26. See R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES 274-83 (1994).
27. See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The
Need for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Sheila Foster, Race(ial)
Matters: The Quest for Environmental Justice, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721 (1993).
28. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 313-19, for a discussion o f partitioning. See
also Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 243-45, for a discussion of these considerations in the
context of cost-benefit analysis.
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looms large in Professor Adler’s welfarist account is this: If one believes that prescriptive regulation ought to be evaluated based upon
deontological, perfectionist, or distributive criteria (or presumably
some combination of each), then welfarist approaches will predictably ring hollow.29 While Professor Adler rightly elides this even more
fundamental question, it is worth noting that this too is a form of
theoretical partitioning. How persuasive ought cost-benefit analysis
be to anyone seriously concerned that regulation of a certain form
and level is necessary to ensure the protection of certain individual
or group rights, for example, the “right” to a clean environment? Is
the upshot of Adler’s partitioning that cost-benefit analysis has absolutely nothing to say to such a person?
This partitioning is less apparent in connection with distributive
criteria, for in Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, Professors Adler and
Posner contemplate the introduction of certain distributive criteria
into their configuration of cost-benefit analysis. 30 In essence, then,
they accept the inevitability that some of these other, nonwelfarist
criteria will likely creep into an otherwise welfarist account of regulation. Once these criteria have crept in, though, what is to keep
nonwelfarist criteria mostly at bay? Why is not the gist of the theory
that welfarism is part of an overall normative strategy? Of course,
Adler has much more in mind. Yet, it is coming to terms with the
scope of this partitioning and, more fundamentally, the relationship
between welfarist theories and deontological, perfectionist, and distributive considerations that is presumably the next big stage in Professor Adler’s ambitious effort to reconceptualize the modern theory
of regulation.
III. REGULATORY INCREMENTALISM
I will assume that Professor Adler has in mind not an idealized,
highly abstracted notion of regulatory politics and policymaking, but
rather the real world of regulation in the modern administrative
state. While eschewing any particular positive account of regulation,
he does turn our attention to contemporary administrative regulation. So what do we see when we turn our attention, with Professor
Adler, to modern regulatory administration?
Fundamentally, we see that regulatory agencies act incrementally. That is, they act upon the social or economic problem brought
before them (frequently in the context of enforcement or litigation),
and they craft regulatory strategies to deal with the particular issues
29. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 313-19.
30. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 238-45. They state, “Agencies should use
CBA to evaluate the welfare effect of large projects except where wealth differences between those who gain from the project and those who lose are substantial enough.” Id. at
238.
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raised. Moreover, regulatory policy exists in an environment made
up of many institutions, each assigned different functions and each
relating to one another in overlapping, cross-cutting, and frequently
competitive ways. One of the ways in which regulatory agencies are
distinguished from institutions such as the U.S. Congress is that
agencies are created rather episodically and with an eye toward responding to categories of regulatory programs. Justice Stephen
Breyer echoed the views of other regulation theorists when, a number of years ago, he proposed a large, omnibus regulatory agency
which would be better suited to confront a range of social and economic problems. 31 Breyer’s proposed agency had the capacity to consider trade-offs and priorities and to develop comprehensive regulatory criteria; thus it would have been able to respond more successfully to these polycentric problems. 32 Whatever the normative force of
this injunction, what we are left with at the dawn of a new century in
the United States of America is an alphabet soup of agencies and
regulatory programs. We are thus left with a basically incremental
process of regulatory administration. Moreover, it is a process that is
profoundly political and subject to the turbulence of the economy,
public opinion, and public choice.
It is not the case, to be sure, that regulatory incrementalism is an
inherent and immutable characteristic of administrative behavior
and performance. Professor Adler’s colleague, Professor Colin Diver,
noted many years ago that there are competing paradigms of policymaking and that agencies can and do adopt synoptic, as well as incrementalist, approaches. 33 The choice among these approaches involves not only considerations of optimal regulatory strategy, as best
this can be discerned by the agency, but also decidedly political
choices by legislatures and affected interest groups. Synoptic strategies presuppose both a sustainable body of information available to
the agency and the legal authority and political will to employ this
information in order to confront comprehensively important social
and economic problems through innovative regulatory strategies. The
model of the powerful New Deal agency, represented by the failed
experiment of the National Recovery Administration, 34 symbolizes
this aspirational vision of the administrative state as the instrument
of coherent, technocratic, and apolitical public policy. Synopticism
31. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE 55-81 (1993).
32. See id.
33. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law , 95 HARV . L.
REV . 393, 394-95 (1981).
34. The National Recovery Act of 1933 gave authorization to the President to bring
together a National Recovery Administration to draft codes for more than 500 industries.
Each Code was designed both to stabilize labor practices and to avoid destructive competition. See National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-67, § 3, 48 Stat. 196,
196-97.
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represents the choice not only to pursue more activist regulation, but
also to empower agencies to bite off a rather large chunk of the social
and economic problems which call for regulatory intervention. The
nature and scope of the strategies available to the agency should reflect this hopeful and very much comprehensive view of regulation’s
potential.
In addition to the choices agencies, legislators, and interest groups
can make about synoptic versus incremental approaches, there are
significant influences brought to bear by judicial review. The hard
look doctrine was fashioned, after all, as an effort to encourage agencies to act more synoptically. 35 But over the past quarter century,
courts have firmly sided with the incrementalist approach; synoptic
decisionmaking has been all but abandoned. In its place, the federal
courts have substituted a moderate form of hard look review, a review which is tethered to statutory and, less reliably, common law
requirements of well-reasoned decisionmaking. The integrity of procedural rules is to be respected by agencies, as are the imperatives of
considering properly the factors which Congress and the agencies
themselves have spelled out as necessary to pass legal muster.
Pushed more deeply in the background, then, is the requirement of
truly synoptic decisionmaking, a requirement which would have
pushed agency decisionmaking away from incrementalism.
If regulatory incrementalism has persisted, it is not only because
of the triumph of this approach in contemporary regulatory strategy
and in administrative law, but also because there are elements in the
practice of regulatory administration which make agencies tend toward incrementalist strategies. Central to this claim is the basic decisionmaking matrix for agencies in administration. Consider two essential regulatory choices: Agencies make choices not only about
what level of regulation is appropriate and what strategies to deploy
in implementing their regulatory agenda, but also about whether to
pursue one regulatory initiative or another. For simplicity’s sake, let
us call these basic decisions of whether to regulate at all regulatory
initiation or “RI” decisions. We can call other decisions, such as
whether to use certain command-and-control devices or whether to
set the maximum exposure level at .05 or .005, regulatory strategy or
“RS” decisions.
From one perspective, RI and RS decisions are within the same
analytic category in that they both involve regulatory choices. Surely
we could apply a welfarist criterion to assessing both RI and RS decisions; and there is nothing in Adler’s theoretical account which suggests that such types of decisions would be evaluated differently with
respect to this criterion. It bears noting that the practicalities of
35. See SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 52-54.
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these two types of decisions are different in the typical administrative regulation context. Moreover, there are some significant differences drawn in contemporary administrative law doctrine which, at
the very least, make the distinctions between RI and RS decisions salient.
With respect to the practicalities entailed, consider a standard description of a regulatory choice sequence. In their book on automobile
safety regulation, Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst give us a wonderful glimpse into the characteristics of both RI and RS decisions. 36 The
key strategic dilemma for the early National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) concerned the choice between
traditional command-and-control regulation emphasizing design
and/or performance-based criteria and more adjudicatory responses
such as recalls. 37 Lurking below the surface of these ubiquitous strategic dilemmas, however, were questions concerning whether the
agency would intervene at all in certain matters of motor vehicle
safety. For example, the NHTSA never seriously pursued strategies
of driver behavior modification, even though such strategies were arguably contemplated by Congress when enacting the Motor Vehicle
Safety Act of 1965.38 Nor did NHTSA pursue regulation of school
buses and other vehicles, therefore leaving significant risks unregulated. 39 Besides the banal explanation that there is only so much time
and money to go around, it remains unexplained why the agency
tackled any one regulatory initiative rather than another. Regardless
of the positive reasons for activity and passivity with regards to any
particular safety-related strategy, it is significant that these choices
were, in the end, for the agency and Congress to make. 40

36. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
(1990).
37. See id. at 147-71.
38. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, § 1, 80
Stat. 718, repealed by National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994); see MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 36,
at 2, 230-31.
39. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 36, at 141-46.
40. An example of an instance in which the RI and RS decisions overlap completely is
provided by the Supreme Court’s decision in the tobacco case, FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). That case involved the decision by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), ultimately invalidated by the Supreme Court, to regulate
cigarettes as a “nicotine-delivery device” and hence a drug. The RI decision made by the
FDA followed nearly a century of regulatory abstinence. In examining the scope of authority for the FDA to regulate cigarettes, the Supreme Court noted that it would be illogical
for the FDA to conclude that cigarettes were a drug susceptible to regulation under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, but then to stop short of imposing a ban. In essence, the
Court said that the RS decision followed from the RI decision. Only one of two regulatory
outcomes were possible: Either the agency must impose a complete ban, if it were accurate
in concluding that Congress vested in the agency the legal authority to regulate; or, in the
alternative, the agency must not regulate at all in this area. See id. at 1302.
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Modern administrative law doctrine has reinforced the distinction
between RI and RS decisions. In Heckler v. Chaney,41 for example,
the Court considered a decision of the Food and Drug Administration
to refrain from enforcing certain administrative regulations regarding the safe use of drugs in connection with lethal injections administered in the State of Texas. 42 The Court upheld the agency’s judgment concerning the proper allocation of enforcement resources and
hence enforcement discretion, pegging this judgment on the rather
amorphous standard of section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure Act 43 which makes unreviewable by the courts decisions
“committed to agency discretion by law.”44 As a piece of black letter
law, the Chaney case is an example of the Court’s willingness to distinguish between agency enforcement decisions, in which choices
over resource allocation are especially salient and agency discretion
is most valued, and the decisions in which an agency in fact enforces
a regulation but does so “unreasonably.”45
One way to make sense of this distinction is to evaluate the way
in which the Court is sorting RI from RS decisions. RI decisions are
the products of the quintessentially incremental nature of agency decisionmaking. Agencies are supposed to husband their resources and
step into policymaking only where the presumption of caution is
overcome by the imperative of taking regulatory action. This imperative may, of course, result from legislative command, as in those rare
instances in which the legislature truly demands action. Or it may
result from the imperatives of social or economic needs, all of which
point in the direction of agency action. Chaney illustrates the judiciary’s unwillingness to enter aggressively into that determination.
Some of this reticence may, as Justice Rehnquist notes in Chaney, be
the result of the fact that there is “no law to apply” and, therefore,
that courts have no textual basis for displacing agency reasoning.46
Additionally, some of this reticence may result from judgments of
comparative institutional incompetence. Lurking in the background

41. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
42. See id. at 823-25.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994).
44. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 837-38.
45. See id. at 831-32 (noting the “general unsuitability” of a decision not to enforce for
judicial review and stressing the “complicated balancing” of factors, including resource allocation).
46. Id. at 829-33. The Court stated:
Similarly, the Secretary’s decision here does not fall within the exception for
action “committed to agency discretion.” This is a very narrow exception. . . .
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is
applicable in those rare instances where “statutes are drawn in such broad
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.”
Id. at 830 (quoting an earlier Supreme Court decision and a Senate Report on the
APA).

384

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:375

of these judicial judgments, however, is a concern with the essentially incrementalist character of modern regulatory administration.
Regulatory incrementalism looms large in another key administrative law decision, decided only two years before Chaney, Motor
Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.47 That case involved the Secretary of Transportation’s
decision to rescind the passive restraint requirement in the early
days of the Reagan administration. 48 Before the Court turned
squarely to the agency’s reasoning process, concluding that the
agency acted unreasonably and in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 49 it considered whether agency decisions to deregulate
would be subject to a different standard of review.50
Significantly, the case for a different standard came from both
ends of the ideological spectrum. Those concerned that the Reagan
administration was threatening to roll back health and safety regulation counseled a standard of strict scrutiny for deregulatory decisions; the proper baseline, in this account, was regulation and, therefore, efforts to turn back the regulatory clock should be subject to especially searching review.51 Others maintained that the baseline was
properly no regulation, that is, the free market. As a consequence, efforts at deregulation merely restored the status quo ante and were to
be subject, then, to more deferential review.52 The Supreme Court in
State Farm rejected both of these approaches, instead grounding its
review on the same standard as with any other regulatory decision. 53
What was critical in State Farm is that the agency had made a
choice, not that this choice was in the direction of augmenting or decreasing the level of regulation existing before this choice was made.
The Department of Transportation’s decision was fundamentally
an RS decision. Therefore, the Court was quite willing to subject the
47. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
48. See id. at 34.
49. See id. at 57 (holding that the agency “failed to supply the requisite ‘reasoned
analysis’”).
50. See id. at 41-44.
51. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV . L. REV . 505,
520-24 (1985) (describing the arguments and setting out reasons why earlier cases rejected
this view). In State Farm itself, however, State Farm did not argue for a heightened standard of review, but it specifically asserted that “arbitrary and capricious” review was
proper. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 45. The Court of Appeals, though, had “intensif[ied]
the scope of its review” based on Congressional acts prior to the attempted deregulation.
Id. at 44.
52. See the discussion in U.S. Government’s brief. Brief for the Federal Parties at 16,
State Farm (Nos. 82-354, 82-355, 82-398) (arguing that “[t]he Safety Act . . . embodies a
congressional presumption against regulation”). See also State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41 (rejecting the argument by the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association that a less exacting
standard than “arbitrary and capricious” would be proper).
53. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 40-46. The Court explicitly stated, “While . . . it may
be easier for an agency to justify a deregulatory action, the direction in which an agency
chooses to move does not alter the standard of judicial review . . . .” Id. at 42.
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agency’s choice among regulatory strategies to a reasonably searching standard of review. By contrast, the RI decision of the Food and
Drug Administration in Chaney54 and, for that matter, the RI decisions of the NHTSA in the era described by Mashaw and Harfst are
cordoned off from all but a rather pro forma sort of scrutiny.55 Courts
cede much of the discretion to agencies with regard to RI decisions
because of the durable belief that agency decisionmaking is incremental, involving a multitude of specific, and not especially transparent, choices. The range of considerations which go into the choice
between action and inaction are perhaps no more complex, after all,
than the range of considerations which go into the choice among
regulatory strategies. But, for better or worse, the action/inaction
choice is mostly separated (in Adler’s words, partitioned) from legal
scrutiny.
The response from the perspective of Adlerian welfarism might be
that, after all, what is being raised here is merely a question of implementation. Professor Adler might say that while it is difficult to
assess RI decisions, it is surely theoretically plausible to do so and,
therefore, we might, with suitable hard work, apply properly welfarist criteria to both types of decisions. It remains unclear, however,
how a welfarist standard such as cost-benefit analysis might be deployed in the area of RI-type decisions. Supposing that we had a
Breyeresque mega-agency which possessed both the legal authority
and the resources to make comprehensive regulatory decisions, then
we might consider agency decisions to act through the lens of costbenefit analysis. Are the benefits of regulatory action in a certain
area worth the costs associated with such action? Cost-benefit analysis would seem especially appropriate in this context. Yet, we lack
such an omnibus agency structure. Instead, each regulatory decision
in the modern administrative state represents a choice by one agency
to take action and to choose from an admixture of regulatory strategies. If we would subject both elements of this choice to normative
evaluation, we would need a fairly complete, and rather complicated,
set of welfarist criteria. After all, the problem is not merely one of incommensurability, but one concerning the practicalities of administrative decisionmaking. There may well be in the cost-benefit analysis frameworks of Professors Adler and Posner the elements of a
strategy to deal with the incremental quality of regulatory decisionmaking, but suffice it to say that current iterations of cost-benefit
analysis almost entirely write off RI-type decisions, leaving this to
the supposedly informed discretion of agencies. To partition such de-

54. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
55. See MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 36, at 224-31 (discussing the role of “legal culture” in supporting courts’ reticence to scrutinize recall decisions).
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cisions is to leave out one of the key elements of regulatory policymaking in the modern administrative state.
IV. THE PROB LEMS WITH COST-BENEFIT WELFARISM
Let us try to get out from under serious implementation problems
and instead concentrate on the theoretical promise of cost-benefit
analysis as a valuable welfarist approach. Leave aside whether
courts, legislators, or the agencies themselves are going to police the
processes of administrative regulation. Is not cost-benefit analysis a
superior template for regulatory choice given the deficiencies of other
approaches? Maybe yes, maybe no, although the advantages start to
disappear when we confront, again, the incrementalist quality of
regulatory decisionmaking in the modern administrative state.
Consider the problem of regulatory jurisdiction. There are many
different agencies with jurisdiction to regulate certain social and
economic problems. Indeed, some agency authorities overlap with one
another, for example, in the environmental and health and safety areas. To say that each agency ought to employ cost-benefit analysis in
making regulatory choices is to say, in essence, that each agency decision in which the benefits outweigh the costs adds to overall wellbeing. But to say this is to make the same ordinalist error that Adler
describes elsewhere. 56 Decision outcomes may interact with one another; one agency pursuing one strategy may, even if justified by reference to cost-benefit analysis, impede another agency’s ambitions to
the detriment of overall well-being.
This is, to be sure, not a serious theoretical objection. The enterprise of developing welfarist criteria for evaluating regulation can coexist with heterogeneous choices made by many cross-cutting institutions. We can take a look at the aggregate of agency decisions and
ask whether the benefits of regulation at Time A outweigh the costs.
However, this is a far less pertinent question for the real world of
agency decisionmaking. Cost-benefit analysis, or any other sort of actual welfarist methodology, must be helpful in evaluating particular
regulatory choices in the real world. And these are, as has been explained, always going to be the choices of specific agencies acting
within the scope of specific constraints and acting for distinct reasons. The fact that agency jurisdiction, and hence the range of agency
choice, is constrained means that there will surely be instances in
which an agency action will yield costs well in excess of the benefits
of the particular regulation, but there will be the full expectation
that the overall content of regulation will enhance overall well-being.
It is hard to understand, for example, elements of contemporary labor or antitrust laws in any other way.
56. See Beyond Efficiency, supra note 1, at 278-79.
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Specifically, the result of a decision under section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 57 for example, is to impose discernible, and often draconian, costs on a business enterprise. That these costs are borne by
an accused “monopolist” does not diminish the fact that this firm
faces massive costs. So, where are the benefits? They are the advantages associated with freer competition of course, the sine qua non of
the antitrust laws. Yet, how is any welfarist decision metric going to
calculate successfully the benefits associated with freer competition
(benefits which may be speculative and often reaped in the long
term) and therefore assess these benefits against the measurable
costs faced by the loser monopolist?
The notion that there are cross-cutting effects as a result of multiple agency choices is elementary. Of course, no agency exists in a
regulatory vacuum. The point here is that such cross-cutting effects
are the product of regulatory choices, but they are not, in the main,
taken into account in the making of such choices by any particular
agency. Regulatory incrementalism means that agencies proceed in
light of their legal authority, opportunity costs, regulatory philosophies, political pressures, or whatever other criteria is germane to
their decisionmaking calculus. While we may wish them to take account of the impact of their decisions on other regulatory choices
made by other agencies, it is doubtful as either a practical or a theoretical matter that agencies so calculate. Indeed, it is the essence of
proposals to create mega-agencies (such as Justice Breyer’s famous
proposal in Breaking the Vicious Circle58) or to more effectively empower oversight agencies such as the Office of Management and
Budget to create more effective strategies of monitoring interagency
effects. In other words, it is in the face of the incrementalist character of regulatory administration that various strategies for interagency coordination and regulatory centralization are made.
V. CONCLUSION: WELFARISM AND REGULATORY A DMINISTRATION
Does this assessment of regulatory incrementalism and moral
choice cast into doubt not only Adler’s welfarist account of regulation,
but all normative theories of regulation? In other words, if you take
seriously the nature of regulatory decisionmaking and institutional
design, does it follow that you should be impatient with normative
theories of regulation of any kind? The answer to this question is no.
Furthermore, the modified cost-benefit analysis defended ably by
Professors Adler and Posner strikes me as much better than competing alternatives. Insofar as the case they make for its use rests on
the judgment that first, welfarist approaches are superior to nonwel57. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
58. BREYER, supra note 31, at 55-81.
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farist accounts and second, alternative accounts which purport to be
welfarist are inferior to cost-benefit analysis, the case is an extremely strong argument and deserves careful, sustained attention
by scholars on regulation and administrative law. That regulatory
incrementalism is a phenomenon worth taking fully into account in
creating welfarist theories of perspective regulation is an amendment
to, and not really a criticism of, Adlerian welfarism.
First, the incrementalist character of contemporary regulatory decisionmaking is not an intrinsic characteristic. We could, after all,
design our regulatory system very differently. For example, we could
construct a mega-agency, along the lines suggested by Justice Breyer
in his book on regulation. 59 Such an agency, or another sort of oversight mechanism, could serve to assess regulatory administration
across agencies and across regulatory programs. It could operate to
ensure that each agency decision increases, at the margin, overall
well-being and thereby hopes to ensure, in the aggregate run of regulatory decisions and in the long run, that regulation is welfare enhancing. Or it could ensure that overall regulatory administration is
welfare enhancing while conceding that certain agency decisions
might not increase aggregate welfare. Or, perhaps less plausibly, this
agency could perform an expressly distributive role, seeing to it that
the costs of regulation are more equitably and efficiently distributed,
thereby ensuring that our general system of public policy increases
aggregate well-being. While Professor Adler’s project thus far does
not advance the case for any or all of these centralizing megastrategies, the gist of the normative theory does seem to point in the
direction of a substantially reconfigured, and perhaps less incrementalist, approach to regulatory administration.
Second, certain regulatory theories are, I would suggest, more resilient than others against the incrementalist quality of agency decisionmaking. For example, QUALY-based60 or health-health 61 approaches seem particularly problematic given the complicated interagency dynamics of regulatory administration.62 Take the simplest
dilemma: How can we monitor effectively risk-risk tradeoffs when
different agencies measure the cost of a human life in such different
ways?63 Conversely, interagency dynamics do not appear to challenge
strongly proceduralist theories of regulation. Each agency process
59. See BREYER, supra note 31, at 55-81.
60. “QUALY”—quality-adjusted life years—method is a way to quantify health preferences that attempts to “rank and prioritize health states.” Pildes & Sunstein, supra note
9, at 84.
61. This approach attempts to address the situation where a regulatory action reduces one health risk while increasing another. See generally Sunstein, supra note 9.
62. See Adler & Posner, supra note 2, at 236-38 (discussing QUALY-based approaches); see also Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 9, at 83-85.
63. See Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 1984-85.
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can be assessed on the basis of trans-agency standards of due process
or procedural fairness. 64 Indeed, some versions of proceduralism
counsel uniformity as a method not only of improving the reality and
appearance of administrative fairness but also of improving the efficiency of regulatory outcomes on the theory that certain procedural
forms are more likely correlated with efficient regulation. 65 To the extent that this is correct, regulatory incrementalism jibes nicely with
certain proceduralist theories.
Third, theorists of regulation ought not to be able to pass so easily
by positive accounts of regulatory administration. While Adler partitions with ease the normative and positive questions, the plausibility
of the normative case for welfarism as an evaluative talisman must
inevitably be built upon a positive theory of regulation and administration. My preliminary assessment of the project is that it resonates strongly with common moral intuitions about both the nature
and the capacity of the modern administrative state. At the same
time, though, it sits uneasily within the mainstream of current positive theories of regulatory administration.66 Although Professor Adler’s basic project is normative, it is worth asking this: Is there a
positive theory of regulatory administration which can support the
very hopeful welfarist view of regulation as a mechanism by which
public-regarding officials and hard-working agencies can attempt,
through their sensible decisions, to increase overall well-being?

64. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW , DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 2 (1985)
(emphasizing that his book is “an attempt to specify how we ought to think about due process questions in a bureaucratic state dedicated to liberal-democratic ideals”).
65. See Seidenfeld, supra note 22, at 1534-35 (advocating a larger role for discourse
because it “can enlighten participants about potential community norms,” leading ultimately to “a supportive role [for government] that can enhance individual feelings and selfworth”).
66. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994).

